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The relation between trade policy and growth is a fundamental question 
that requires an answer based on empirical evidence. Measuring the level 
of protection in an economy through time and across countries is the 
main problem with which researchers have been struggling when trying to 
answer this question. Economic historians and development economists 
still depend on the traditional and theoretically poorly based measures of 
protection as the best available instruments to study empirically the rela-
tion between trade and growth in the long run.3 The trade-weighted 
average tariff is the most widely known measure to isolate the effect of 
tariff policies from .that of other policies and provides a very convenient 
index of protection across time because it is easily calculated as the ratio 
of tariff revenues over import values.4 
The motivation of the present work is the abundant recent empirical 
research using ad valorem tariffs rates as a single measure to establish a cor-
relation between growth and trade policy in the long run (Clemens and 
Williamson, 2001; Irwin, 2002; Vamvakidis, 2002; Dejong-Ripoll, 2005; 
O'Rourke, this volume, Chapter 7).5 Positive cross-country correlations 
found between tariffs average and growth during the years of 'the return 
to protection' (1880-1913) strengthened the traditional good reputation 
between protection and growth.6 This chapter discusses some faults that 
make the use of average tariff to establish a causal relationship between 
tariff and growth especially vulnerable, as well as the implications for nine-
teenth-century European commercial policy. 
First, there are a number of luxury consumer products which has 
represented a substantial share of total trade since the sixteenth century, 
most of them traded from tropical countries and heavily taxed, especially 
in Europe, for fiscal reasons and mainly because their low elasticity of 
demand allowed for increases in tariffs and more revenue. 7 The inclusion 
of this kind of product in protection measures for the nineteenth century 
hinges on the specification of demand and, in particular, on how these 
'exotic' products should be treated. The revenue tariff impacts mainly on 
consumer income and government revenue, and its economic effect is 
similar to that of a 'sales tax' over certain luxury products such as tobacco 
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or gasoline. The prevalence of the so-called fiscal products and their 
changing weight over time makes this point important in the analysis of 
the comparative evolution of international trade policies, especially in 
Europe. 
Second, the well-known 'index number problem' of the tariff import 
weighted average usually biases downwards the weight of the most pro-
tected importables. The extent of the bias depends on the height of the 
current tariff rate and on the elasticity of imports of the most heavily 
taxed goods.8 From the first it follows that a country, which imposed pro-
hibitive tariffs on all goods but one (imported free) would appear less pro-
tectionist than another, which raised a uniform 5 per cent duty. The 
generally more elastic demand for manufactures implies a systematic 
downward bias, in tariffs averaging, for industrial goods vis-cl-vis agricul-
tural and fiscal commodities. This bias is especially conspicuous for those 
periods and countries in which revenue products reduced or increased 
their share in total imports at the expense of manufactures. For instance, 
a tariff increase on manufactured goods introduces a downward bias in 
the Spanish average index of protection, and an increase in revenue tariffs 
biases the Italian tariff average index upwards so much as to radically 
change the respective trade policy as well as tariff growth correlations for 
both countries. 
This chapter puts the various criticisms of the use of tariff average to 
the test with regard to the tariff growth debate or the qualification of 
European commercial policies in the nineteenth century. The first section 
discusses Nye's provocative statement of French commercial policy being 
more free trade than the UK's prior to 1880, and points out the implica-
tions of some assumptions on the influence of exotic products in comput-
ing the tariff average for both countries. The second section estimates the 
level and changing share of fiscal products in other European countries, 
and their relevance for a comparative evaluation of commercial policy in 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The third section tackles the 
index number problem in the averaging operations of conventional tariffs 
and attempts to measure the import contraction effect of the Spanish and 
Italian tariffs and its influence during the years of the 'Return to protec-
tion'. Concluding remarks emphasise the importance of taking account of 
the changing weight of the so-called fiscal products for an evaluation of 
trade policy, of scrutinising the index number problem for periods and 
countries with both high levels of protection and a sizeable share of manu-
factured imports. All the evidence at hand advises caution in the use of 
the conventional average tariffs and suggests the estimation of alternative 
manufacture, agrarian and fiscal tariff rates by countries as a necessary 
contribution for a better understanding of the tariff growth debate. 
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A 'cautionary tale': fiscal Britain versus protectionist France 
A revenue tariff mainly affects consumer income and government 
revenue, while its general economic effect is more similar to a 'sales tax' 
over certain 'luxury' goods. In theory, there are no pure fiscal tariffs, 
neither are there pure protective ones. However, those which have a small 
elasticity of demand (so-called fiscal goods) have a much more limited 
impact on welfare and import substitution than those with high elasticity.9 
Generally, fiscal commodities are those with no direct domestic substi-
tutes. \0 The assumption is that a low elasticity of demand is a consequence 
of the absence of clear domestic substitutes (elasticity of substitution close 
to zero), even if this also depends on the size of the home market and its 
stage of development (see Krueger, 1997; O'Rourke, 1997; Irwin, 1998). 
In the absence of specification on demand elasticity, we will make the 
assumption that fiscal products are the commodities that yield the highest 
revenue and have no obvious domestic substitutes. 
The share of revenue products in the nominal protection average index 
is part of a recent debate about the comparative trade policy experience in 
France and the United Kingdom during the nineteenth century (see the 
debate between Irwin and Nye above, Chapters 1-3). Nye's main proposi-
tion is that the comparative examination of the average nominal protection 
index of both countries supports the argument of a freer trade policy in 
France relative to the UK, especially between 1840 and 1880. This observa-
tion is reinforced when applying the tariff rates by commodity class to 
the import distribution of another period close to free trade as a way to test 
the average tariff index. Mter examining some other qualifications on the 
robustness of tariff rates for Britain and France, Nye refuses to accept that 
there is an economic argument in distinguishing between the protectionist 
effect of fiscal tariffs in the United Kingdom and that of tariffs on manufac-
tures which accounted for most of French protectionism. In either case, in 
Britain as in France, the tariff was designed so as to offset imports in which 
both countries suffered a comparative disadvantage. Irwin argues that the 
large share of revenue tariffs during this period is responsible for an upward 
bias in the British tariff rate. In the United Kingdom, fiscal tariffs bore pro-
portionately more on exotic products not produced at home: customs 
duties constituted 'an extension of the domestic excise system, levied only 
on a select number of commodities to raise fiscal revenue without discrimi-
nating against foreign goods in favor of domestic goods'. 11 This would apply 
to brandies or even beer, for which a dutiable excise was designed to offset 
wine duties. Nevertheless, we ignore by how much the difference between 
the French and British average tariff is due to the presence of revenue prod-
ucts. In his reply, Irwin puts forward convincing qualitative arguments but 
no consistent quantitative evidence. As a result, the share of the revenue 
tariffS in the average index emerges as the main point of contention resolv-
ing the Nye-Irwin debate. 
102 Antonio TenaJunguito 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 visualise the quantitative evidence at hand to cast 
some light on the relative weight of fiscal duties in British and French pro-
tectionism. Nye argues that exotic foodstuffs and alcoholic beverages in 
the British tariff were used as an important source of revenue, but the 
tariffs levied on these commodities necessarily induced some form of pro-
tection for direct and indirect substitutes. Fiscal tariffs must have distorted 
domestic production and consumer welfare in Britain, as the protection of 
textiles manufactures did in France. On the basis of this observation, Nye 
insists that Figure 6.1 represents acceptable quantitative evidence of the 
relative protectionist stance of both countries and supports the provoca-
tive argument that France enjoyed freer trade than Britain between the 
repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1840s and the turn to protection in France 
in the 1880s. 
Figure 6.2, by contrast, illustrates the conventional and widely accepted 
argument put forward recently by Irwin that British protection from the 
1840s onwards was mainly of a fiscal character. When leaving aside the 
main fiscal products in dispute (tea, tobacco, sugar, coffee, wine and 
spirits), there is no question that Britain emerges as the country enjoying 
comparatively freer trade - as the traditional view would have it. Irwin 
insists that British tariffs on wine and spirits were 'carefully constructed to 
avoid protecting domestic producers'.l2 Tariffs on wine and foreign spirits 
were required to allow British domestic producers of beer and spirits, who 
were taxed with an excise, to compete, on equal terms, with these 
imported foreign beverages. As a result, tariffs on brandies and even on 
wines did not have a protective effect on domestically produced beverages 
and should be treated as fiscal products like colonial imports such as tea, 
sugar, tobacco and coffee. 
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Figure 6.1 Average tariff rates in Britain and France, 1830-1930. 
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Figure 6.2 Average tariff rates in France and the United Kingdom (aggregate and 
without main fiscal duties). 
Neither Irwin nor Nye pay much attention to the growing share of fiscal 
products in French tariff revenues during the period in question. The 
share of colonial imports such as cocoa, coffee and sugar represented in 
France over 40 per cent of the average tariff rate index in the second half 
of the 1840s and surged to 60 and 70 per cent in the 1860s and 1870s. 
France's trend of nominal protection was therefore strongly influenced by 
fiscal tariffs as well. To be meaningful, a comparison requires taking 
account of the incidence of revenue products in the averaging operation 
of French tariffs. 
Figure 6.3 charts this compromise in which spirits are excluded on 
account of the excise tax offsetting protection of domestic brandies pro-
duction (as suggested by Irwin), but wine is included and considered a 
protected good, because the excise beer did not fully compensate for the 
wine duty (as Nye insists). With this new British rate of protection, we 
repair to familiar ground: Britain appears to have been more protectionist 
than France before the 1840s but this decade represents a complete turn-
around in the country's commercial history - reducing protection by half 
in the space of a mere six years, when her main partner, France, was 
holding the line. This shows that, while earlier moves towards freer trade 
had been conditioned by an insistence on reciprocity, from the 1840s 
onwards British trade policy tended to be unilaterally determined. The 
1846 repeal of the Corn Laws appears to have been instrumental in the 
fall of the index, even if tariff reductions were introduced in the early 
1840s. French tariff reductions gathered momentum only at the turn of 
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Figure 6.3 A compromise aggregate tariff rate for Britain and France excluding 
fiscal goods, 1827-1913. 
the decade, and were less dramatic than in Britain. During the 1850s, 
the average French tariff level was almost double the British one, and 
converged only significantly after the 1860s, a trend which persisted to 
the 1870s. The French backlash against liberalisation built up in the 
1870s and culminated in the early 1890s with the passing of the Meline 
tariff. 
One can hope to disentangle the fiscal from the protective impact of 
tariffs, first, by excluding the respective four main revenue products in 
each country and, second, by removing spirits and wine, the two contro-
versial British excisable goods. The outcome of the first operation exhibits 
a similarity in both levels and trend between the two countries since the 
1840s. France appears to have been more liberal than Britain before the 
abolition of the Corn Laws. The much-praised British liberalising meas-
ures resulted in an average tariff rate slightly lower than that of French, its 
rival by the 1860s; by the early 1880s, however, both countries exhibited 
almost identical levels of protection. Following the Cobden-Chevalier 
Treaty, France's liberalising efforts resulted in an even lower rate of pro-
tection than that observed across the Channel. 
Excluding wine and spirits duties takes us back to the conventional 
wisdom defended by Irwin. Here, the controversial wine and spirits and 
their adjacent duties are removed from the computation of the average 
tariff rate. Prime Minister Peel's reforms of the 1840s caused a steep 
reduction in the British tariff rate, both in absolute terms and in relation 
to the French rate. France followed in the footsteps of Britain during the 
1850s, and the Cobden-Chevalier 1860s triggered faster liberalisation in 
France; meanwhile the UK remained ahead in the free-trade league for 
the rest of the nineteenth century. 
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Figure 6.4 (a) Rate of excise and ad valorem tariff on spirits 1827-1913. 
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Figure 6.4 (b) Rate of excise on beer ad valorem tariff on wine 1827-1913. 
As a result, the wine, rum and brandy tariffs, and the excise on their 
domestic substitutes, beer and spirits, appear crucial in this debate. Figure 
6.4a provides some additional evidence charting the ad valorem spirit duty 
and its respective ad valorem rate of excise over the period 1840 to 1913. 
The spirit tariff fell by half from the 1830s to the 1840s, and hovered 
during the 1840s a cut above the excise ratio. Only in the second half of 
the 1850s did this trend undergo an upturn, resulting in the rate of excise 
being at least twice as high as the tariff rate during the next two decades. 
Figure 6.4b offers a graphic representation of the relation between the 
wine tariff and the beer excise ratios over time. Before 1850, the wine duty 
stood more than four-times higher than the rate of excise on beer (its 
main substitute produced in the United Kingdom). 
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In the second half of the 1850s, the excise was reduced steeply in 
accordance with the Cobden-Chevalier negotiations. From the 1860s the 
wine duty always appears close to double the beer excise. As a result, the 
evidence assembled here encourages the adoption of a reasonable com-
promise between Nye's and Irwin's positions. The wine duty seems to have 
been independent of beer excise and may have influenced domestic beer 
production, and could therefore be regarded as protective; by contrast, 
the spirit excise seems to have consistently offset its tariff duty on 
imported spirits and could be regarded as purely fiscal. 
With the use of a CGE model, O'Rourke reached a similar conclusion 
on the Nye-Irving debate: 'If wine, rum and brandy are not treated as 
exotic, but are assumed to be as substitutable with British goods as 
imported wheat or timber, then Nye is spectacularly right' (see O'Rourke 
in Chapter 4, p. 63). O'Rourke, however, did not consider the special case 
of excisable exotic goods. With evidence on fiscal duties and rates of 
excise, we should retain Nye's contention of the protectionist effect of the 
British wine duty but push its significance on overall protection back in 
time (before the 1840s); on the whole, this scenario is reconcilable with 
the mainstream view of British trade policy.13 Furthermore, his provocative 
claim should encourage the use of caution when dealing with overall tariff 
rates and calls for more attention to be paid to the fiscal products when 
evaluating average protection rates on the basis of customs revenues. 
The role of revenue and protective tariffs in nineteenth-
century trade policy 
The previous section discussed the absence of a clear economic criterion 
to isolate purely fiscal tariffs from protective and discriminatory ones, but 
suggests that tariff rates excluding exotic products would probably provide 
a better indicator of trade restrictiveness than the commitments negoti-
ated at the multilateral and bilateral level among Europe's main trading 
partners. In this section we offer additional evidence on how exotic prod-
ucts without obvious substitutes, such as sugar, cocoa, tea or coffee, 
represented a significant fraction of European imports and try to assess 
the relevance of this distinction for evaluating nineteenth-century trade 
policies. 
A general impression 
Figure 6.5 documents the changing impact of fiscal products on the 
overall tariff rate in some core European countries during the nineteenth 
century.14 For the United Kingdom, fiscal revenues in a context of falling 
protection accounted for between 40 to 80 per cent of the total, the trend 
exhibiting a growing cyclical pattern from the 1820s to the First World 
War. 
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Figure 6.5 Share of fiscal in total tariff revenue for main European countries, 
1827-1913. 
In the case of France, this share increased from 35 per cent in the 
1830s to 70 per cent at the end of the 1870s, before falling again to about 
40 per cent at the turn of the twentieth century, when general protection 
spread across the trade classification. Germany, by contrast, exhibits a 
more moderate and constant influence of exotic products in its tariff rate 
with a cyclical pattern undulating in the 20-30 per cent range. The share 
of exotic goods in the overall tariff rates of Spain and Italy experienced 
a trend reversal around 1870. Fiscal products became more prevalent 
in Italy's tariff revenue while Spain experienced the reverse during the 
years of return to protection between 1875-1900 (they ranged from -5 
(below average) to 20 per cent for the former, to 20-60 per cent for the 
latter) . 
Was Gennany first? 
On the basis of these observations we are led to amend our perception of 
the comparative history of European protectionism. As Figure 6.6 illustrates, 
Germany's overall tariff rate over the period 1880-1914 does not seem 
to match the received account of German trade policy, as presented by 
Bairoch (1989), especially with respect to France's own during the same 
period. 
On the basis of the tariff rate charted in Figure 6.6, it seems 
indisputable that Germany was not the forerunner in the return to protec-
tion in Continental Europe as the early adoption of the July 1879 Bis-
marck tariff would have us believe. The French backlash against 
globalisation materialised at least as early and more dramatically than the 
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Figure 6.6 French and German average tariff rates with and without fiscal goods, 
1870-1913 (sources: own database). 
German one, reaching a significantly higher level during the first half of 
the 1890s. MteIWards, both countries exhibited a similar decreasing pro-
tection level until the First World War, reflecting the incidence of the 
general price increase on ad valorem equivalents of unchanged (specific) 
duties. 
Once exotic products are excluded from the average tariff, however, an 
alternative history appears, as Figure 6.6 illustrates. Here, Germany's pre-
cocity in introducing protection in the 1880s is clearly identifiable, 
showing levels almost twice as high as the French equivalents at the end of 
decade. Only for a short time span of two years after the passing of the 
Meline tariff in 1892 and apparently more steadily after the tariff revision 
of March 1910, was the French average tariff above the German. Between 
the two dates, the German average was steadily above its French counter-
part, a scenario more in tune with the standard narrative of the Return to 
protection. 
spanish versus Italian protectionism 
The last cautionary tale about the influence of fiscal products on tariff 
rates is illustrated by the commercial history of two peripheral countries: 
Spain and Italy. Italy during the twenty years after its unification remained 
a virtually free-trade country; meanwhile, in Spain, a shorter and more 
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doubtful free-trade period started in the mid-1860s to be cut short by the 
adoption of the July 1877 tariff which displayed for the first time the 
double tariff (general and conventional) that was to be adopted by many 
other European countries in the following years. Subsequently, the Italian 
tariff, passed in 1878, while still relatively moderate, preceded the 1879 
German tariff. Most scholars concur that it was not before the 1887 tariff 
that Italy adopted a decisively protectionist policy and, for Spain, not 
before the Canovas Law of 1892. The Italian 1887 tariff brought into force 
a new duty on wheat and some manufactured goods that caused an open 
trade war with France, then Italy's main trading partner. The 1887 tariff 
lasted officially more than three decades, although it underwent some 
minor amendments. From the mid-1890s, the country's overall level of 
protection fell as price inflation reduced the incidence of specific duties 
on the tariff rate. Spain's 1892 protectionist tariff also caused a tariff war 
with France and Germany. In addition, the loss of her remaining colonies 
(Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico) in 1898 amputated her export 
markets and induced, in both government and the public, a pessimism 
which, in turn, led to calls for increased protectionism that materialised in 
the new 1906 tariff. 15 
On the basis of this qualitative evidence, historians have assumed that 
both countries conducted broadly similar trade policies. A look at the 
respective tariff rates partially confirms this conventional wisdom, at least 
for the years of the return of protection. Protection appears to have been 
on the ascendant in Italy from the late 1870s onwards, but it is not until the 
late 1880s that its overall tariff rate caught up and overtook the Spanish 
level which was itself on an upward slope. Likewise, the downturn in both 
Italy and Spain occurred in the mid-1890s while the overall rate hovered 
around the 12 per cent mark during the first decade of the twentieth 
century. As a result, the Spanish protection index does not seem to fit with 
the idea of a temporary return to protection as the Italian one does; it 
appears to be more of a structural feature of the Spanish economy from 
the second half of the 1870s onwards. However, from the mid-1880s to the 
early 1900s, Italy exhibited a superior average tariff level than Spain. 
During the years of the 'return of protection', three consumer goods 
(sugar, coffee and oil) yielded around half of total customs revenue in 
Italy, while in Spain the three main revenue earners (cod, coffee and oil) 
accounted for only one-fifth of the total (and all colonial goods for a 
quarter). As Figure 6.7 illustrates, the combined weight of the three main 
exotic products in the average tariff was much heavier in Italy than in 
Spain, while the trend of this change was practically the reverse in either 
country. 
Figure 6.7 shows that, in excluding three main exotic products, the 
Italian free-trade period can easily be extended until the 1887 tariff (its 
tariff rate culminating at 6 per cent). The upward trend in protection is 
much less impressive than when fiscal products are included, with peaks 
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Figure 6. 7 Spanish and Italian average tariff rates with and without fiscal goods, 
1870-1913 (sources: own database). 
over 10 per cent during the 1890s. The direct implication is that one 
cannot understand the structure of Italian duties without taking into 
account the fiscal side of the issue. The increased importance of Italian 
fiscal duties is noticeable from the late 1870s onwards, and buoyed custom 
revenues significantly in the following years without affecting imports sub-
stantially. Fiscal protection accounted for about three-quarters of the rise 
in total protection from 1877 to 1897 (Federico and Tena, 1998, Table 1). 
In Spain, the main fiscal duties were imposed after the 1898 Cuban war, 
following the fiscal reforms of Fernandez Villaverde in 1899, when taxa-
tion of colonial goods increased substantially. Nevertheless, while 
enhanced fiscal tariffs affected the domestic price of these goods, they did 
not alter significantly the trend and level of Spanish overall protectionism, 
because of their small share in total imports. Comparing both countries' 
nominal protection rates for the crucial 1890s reveals an increase in 
aggregate protection of comparable magnitude. But the increment in 
Italian protection was mainly due to the taxation of fiscal products, and 
the Spanish increase was mainly due to the introduction of a higher tariff 
on manufactured goods (Federico and Tena, 1998; 1999). 
fudustrial, fiscal tariffs and the classic index problem 
A well-known index number problem plagues the computation of an 
accurate trade-weighted average tariff, which is usually biased downwards 
by the most protected goods. The extent of the bias depends on the 
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current tariff level and on the elasticity of demand for the major imports.16 
While the Italian turn to protection is exaggerated by the prevalence of 
fiscal tariffs, there is a tendency to downplay Spanish protectionism on 
account of index number problems in measuring the incidence of any 
increase in the taxation of manufactured goods. The use of alternative 
indices suggests a much higher level for overall protection in Spain rela-
tive to Italy which has implications for the trade-growth relationship in 
the two economies. 
The tariff average index 
Nrt= !(QI*I;I)/!(~*Pil) 
;=1 ;=1 
is a Paasche index that weights the duty on individual products by their 
respective share in total imports for any given year. A classic index number 
problem arises because when I; increases Mi falls: a relatively small rise in 
duty collection can generate a relatively large fall in the quantity imported 
causing a downward bias (or index number problem) in Nrovertime. The 
more elastic the demand for manufactured goods, the larger the downward 
bias for this class of goods vis-a-vis primary or exotic products in the compu-
tation of a tariff average. Off-setting this bias is especially necessary for those 
periods and countries in which exotic products reduced or increased their 
share in total imports in relation with manufactured goods. 
In Table 6.1 we offer a comparative test on the robustness of the con-
ventionally weighted (NI) and unweighted (UN!) tariff rates. We should 
expect the ratios (columns 5 and 6) to be below 1, the wider distance 
from 1 implying a bigger index number problem for the accuracy of the 
Nt conventional tariff rates. The evidence presented here reveals that, on 
the one hand, the Spanish Nr/ UNT ratio is, for each single year, and for 
both manufactured goods and total imports, always below 1 and 
systematically larger than in Italy; on the other hand, the downward bias 
Table 6.1 Weighted (NT) and unweighted (UNT) tariff average for Spain and Italy 
1877-1926 
NT NT UNT UNT NT/UNT NT/UNT 
Spain Italy Spain Italy (SPain) (Italy) 
1877 Total 12.7 7.3 17.7 6.8 0.72 1.07 
Industry 17.6 6.5 22.4 5.4 0.78 1.20 
1889 Total 11.0 17.6 16.7 16.9 0.66 1.04 
Industry 13.8 16.9 17.6 15.6 0.78 1.08 
1897 Total 14.6 18.5 26.3 16.1 0.55 1.15 
Industry 18.4 13.2 32.4 15.2 0.56 0.87 
1913 Total 14.9 9.6 25.2 12.7 0.59 0.75 
Industry 15.5 9.3 23.6 11.9 0.66 0.78 
1926 Total 15.5 11.9 26.6 13.7 0.58 0.87 
Sources: Spain: Tena (1999); Italy: Federico and Tena (1998). 
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of the Spanish index looms larger for the years that follow the main tariff 
reforms (1897, 1913 and 1926); finally, the year with the largest 
divergence is 1897, which cannot be taken as a simple matter of chance 
since this year comes after the introduction of the 1892 tariff which stood 
for the adoption of decisively protectionist policies. Meanwhile, one notices 
no significant contraction of the ratios in the case of Italy (only for the final 
year 1913 did it fall below 0.8). Two factors account for the much smaller 
bias observed in this case relative to Spain during the period 1889-97; first, 
import substitution played a much bigger role for the most protected prod-
ucts - whether manufactured or primary - after the adoption of the Spanish 
1892 tariff compared to the Italian 1887 tariff; second, the larger share of 
revenue products in the Italian tariff and hysteresis - the lower initial level 
of Italy'S industrial tariffs - are probably responsible for a limited import 
substitution effect for both manufactured and overall imports. 
In an attempt to evaluate the respective import substitution effect, we 
decompose the changes in tariff rates (NTt) to measure the demand elas-
ticity of imports as the ratio of quantity decline in relation to tariff and 
price changes. 
Table 6.2 documents the breakdown in the change of the weighted 
average tariff rate (NTt) based on the available information for the 
periods following the adoption of protectionist tariffs in 1887 and 189l. 
Italy's 'turn to protection', carried out from a situation of virtual free 
trade, appears more spectacular. 
Besides, the comparative breakdown of the NT change with regard to 
tariffs, price and quantity imports reveals the order of magnitude of the 
index number problem for the overall and industrial tariff rates. Despite 
the steep increase in protection between 1877 and 1889, the Italian elas-
ticity of import demand (0.26) was less than half that of Spain (0.53). This 
Table 6.2 Decomposition of changes [NTt - NTt - 1] in overall tariff rate during 
the turn to protectionism 
Spain 1897 Tariff Price Quantity Import elasticity NT, - NT,-J 
relative to 1889 (1) (2) (3) (4) = (3)/[(1) + (2)} 
Total 6.8 0.9 -4.1 -0.53 3.6 
Industrial goods 8.5 -0.5 -5.8 -0.72 2.1 
Primary goods 5.6 1.8 -2.3 -0.31 5.1 
Italy 1889 Tariff Price Quantity Import elasticity NT, - NT,-J 
relative to 1877 (1) (2) (3) 
Total 13.1 0.9 -3.7 -0.264 10.3 
Industrial goods 15.1 -4.4 -1.3 -0.121 9.4 
Primary goods 11.8 6.6 -7.8 -0.438 10.6 
Sources: Own database, see Federico and Tena (1998) and Tena (1999). 
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means that the Spanish return of protection as measured by ~ - ~-1 is 
effectively minimised by substantial import contraction (almost half) while, 
in the case of Italy, the contraction effect was much more limited (0.264), 
close a quarter, most of the lever provided by primary products. In Spain, 
the demand behaviour of manufactured imports was even more elastic 
(0.72), around six times that ofItaly (0.12). In this country, by contrast, the 
demand elasticity of primary products exhibits coefficients only slightly 
superior to those of Spain. Most of the evidence assembled in Table 6.2 sup-
ports the contention that the increase in trade discrimination between 1889 
and 1897 is minimised by the use of the crude tariff rate. During this period 
in Spain, protectionist tariffs were raised from an already high level of pro-
tection, and data suggest an especially high elasticity of import substitution 
for most manufactured goods. As the unweighted tariff average (UN1) dis-
played in Table 6.1 illustrate, Spanish industrial protection almost doubled 
between 1889 and 1897, pointing to the apparent moderation of the 
Spanish industrial tariff having damped substantial import contraction. As 
could be expected, the elasticity for Spanish manufactured imports was 
more than double that of primary goods, while in the Italian case it was the 
reverse. Import contraction also depends on the base year chosen to 
compute the tariff level. As it happens, the Spanish 1889 tariff was already 
quite high, higher in any case than that for primary products, exactly the 
reverse situation as that observed in Italy in 1877. 
Table 6.3 documents the contribution of each major class of imports, as 
well as prominent products to the tariff hike after Spain's and Italy's 
'return to protection'. The contribution of every sector is assessed on the 
basis of the difference between the overall protection (measured by the 
arithmetic average of NT, UNT and RN1) and the estimated counterfac-
tual rate on the assumption of the stability of tariffs and demand in the 
sector before and after the introduction of the new tariffs in Spain in 1897 
and Italy in 1889. The main contributor to Italy's 'return of protection' 
was the increase in the taxation of primary products, especially that 
bearing on a handful of fiscal products. Keeping Italian tariffs on and 
demand for, sugar, petroleum and coffee at the same levels in 1889 as in 
1877 reveals that fiscal products were responsible for more than half of 
the total protection increment in this period. Conversely, the manufactur-
ing sector emerges as the main beneficiary of Spain's return to protection 
between 1889 and 1897, as duties on textiles contributed to almost half of 
the incremental tariff revenue, followed by wheat with less than a quarter 
of the total. Among protected goods, consumer goods and its largest 
component, cotton textiles, enjoyed the highest degree of protection, 
although the steel industry 'got a piece of the pie' (Federico and Tena, 
1999). In Italy, by contrast, industrial protection was more moderate; the 
advantage went to heavy industries such as steel and chemicals, which 
improved their ranking in the tariff schedule (Federico and Tena, 1998). 
Protection of agricultural produce in Spain exhibits greater stability than 
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that displayed by manufactured goods. It is generally admitted that when 
the overall protection index is moderate, agriculture improves its position 
vis-a-vis industry, and the reverse is true when protection is on the rise. 
Spanish fiscal tariffs jacked up at the turn of the century, but this did not 
affect this general shape of trade policy (Federico and Tena, 1999). 
Evidence provided in this section confirms that, because manufactures 
tend to have higher demand elasticity and fiscal products the lower, this 
introduces a downward bias in estimating a tariff's protectionist impact. 
This defect is especially damaging for periods during which the share of 
revenue items in total imports was large in relation to manufactured goods. 
The prominence of this phenomenon stands out when comparing changes 
in the Spanish and Italian cases. The significant increase in Spanish protec-
tion on manufactures cannot be detected by using the overall weighted 
tariff rate, while the steep increase in fiscal tariffs is reflected completely by 
the Italian index. Thus the industrial tariff hike tended to bias the Spanish 
index of protection downwards, while revenue tariffs biased the Italian 
tariff index upwards to the extent that it could radically change the assess-
ment of the reality of each country's trade policy. 
Conclusion 
This study recommends caution in the use of average tariff rates for the 
study of comparative European commercial history. We acknowledge that 
it is, in theory, not possible to exclude exotic products from average tariff 
rates because there is no such thing as a purely fiscal nor a purely protec-
tive tariff. This chapter takes up the challenge while examining the differ-
ences induced by the inclusion or exclusion of exotic tariffs on welfare 
impact. Fiscal products with a low elasticity of demand typically have much 
less impact on welfare than those with high elasticity. Thus the Nye-Irwin 
debate on nineteenth-century Britain and France brings forth the implica-
tions of not taking into account the changing share of topical products in 
the evaluation of average tariff barrier for the analysis of nineteenth-
century European trade policy. We offer some evidence on how the separ-
ate treatment of fiscal tariffs can enlighten our understanding of 
nineteenth-century trade policy. 
Furthermore, it has been shown how standard measures of the average 
tariff rate may entail a significant bias in assessing the degree of tariff pro-
tection because of the multi-faceted nature of a classic index number 
problem. Since manufactures usually have the most elastic demand, 
primary products and foodstuff the least, a systematic downward bias is 
introduced for those periods of the rapidly changing share of revenue 
products in total imports relative to manufactures. Evidence suggests the 
need to use cross-country comparisons to assess trade protection for indus-
trial, primary and fiscal goods more accurately and as a prerequisite for 
clarifying the tariff growth debate. 
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In a contribution mentioned earlier, O'Rourke recognised that 'the 
average tariff measure which [he was] using is extremely crude, and 
[could] in some cases be misleading .... The construction of a superior 
index of protection, on an uniform basis, for as many countries as possible 
during the late 19th century should be a major research priority' 
(O'Rourke, this volume: 146). This chapter has been stimulated by 
O'Rourke's observation and it is hoped it will contribute to clarify the 
main variables that influence the accuracy of the tariff measures and the 
different implications this has for investigating the mechanism between 
trade policies and economic growth. 
Appendix 
&urces and methods on tariff revenues and fiscal products 
United Kingdom: data on import value and customs revenue 
Total import value and total custom revenue from 1827 to 1913: Imlah 
(1958). 
Fiscal products import value and customs revenue for: coffee, tea, sugar, 
tobacco, spirits and wine: 
• Quantities and revenues from: House of Commons (1898), 'Customs 
tariffs of the United Kingdom from 1800-1897',85, London; Board of 
Trade, British Parliamentary Papers 1890-1913, yearly. 
• Prices for coffee, tea, sugar, tobacco, spirits and wine before 1854, 
using declared values from the official trade statistics of 1854 and the 
Sauerbeck's price index (1886) 'import price index omitting cotton 
and wool'. 
• Quantities, prices and revenues 1890-1913: Board of Trade (various 
years) and Annual Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom, British 
Parliamentary Papers (various years). 
UK Fiscal data on Excise revenue and Production, 1841-1913 for Spirits 
and Beer & Ale from House of Commons (1898). 
Prices: spirits and beer export prices from Board of Trade (various years). 
France: data on import value and customs revenue 
Total import value and total customs revenue from 1827 to 1913, from 
Levy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1990). Imported values and tariff rev-
enues for cocoa, sugar, coffee, petroleum (1827-95), Tableau General du 
Commerce de la France (1896-1913), Tableau General du Commerce de la France 
et de la Navigation (Commerce Special). 
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Germany: data on import value and customs revenue 
Total import value and total customs revenue from 1880 to 1913, from 
Mitchell (1981). 
Data on customs revenue of coffee, tobacco (Fiscal 2) from Statistisches 
Jahrbuch fur das Deutche Reich (1880-1913). 
Data on import values of coffee and tobacco from Der auswiirtige Handel 
Deutchlands in denJahren ... (various years). 
Italy: data on import value and customs revenue 
Italy total revenue from 1864-72: Ragioneria Generale delto Stato 1969 table 
12 (Riscossioni complessive delle dogane, 1873-1913: R. Repaci (1962), pp. 
84-5 and 208. 
Total import value and tari~ revenue from sugar and coffee from Movi-
mento Commerciale dalt1talia (yearly). 
Spain: data on import value and customs revenue 
Total import value between 1850-1913: new series by Prados de la Esco-
sura (1986). Total revenue from Estadisticas del Comercio Exterior (yearly). 
The revenue of a tax imposed on foreign sugar and paid at the border 
between 1882-98 is also included. Import value and tariff revenue 
between 1850-1913 of sugar, coffee, cacao and brandies from Estadisticas 
del Comercio Exterior. Sugar revenue 1882-98, Martin (1982), Cuadro c.3, 
p.349. 
Decomposition of changes in Total Nominal Protection 
[NTt - NTt - 1]17 
NTt= !(Q/~t)/!(Qt*Pit) 
;=1 i=1 
RNTt = ! ( Qit- 1 * Ti,) /! ( Qit- 1 * Pit-I) 
;=J j=] 
RNPt = ! ( Qit- 1 * Tit) /! ( Qit- 1 * Pit) 
i=l i=] 
[NTt- NTt-l] = [NTt- RNPt] + [RNPt- RNTt] + [RNTt- NTt-l] 
[NTt - NTt - 1] = Quantity Eff. + Price Eff. + Tariff Eff. 
Each component on the right-hand side of the fourth equation measures 
how much the aggregate protection (NI) would have changed ceteris 
paribus. The first term, or quantity effect, estimates the variation that 
118 Antonio TenaJunguito 
would be caused by changes in the composition of imports if duties and 
prices remained constant. The second term, or price effect, computes the 
change that would be caused by changes in prices ceteris paribus when 
duties and demand structure are constant. The third one, the tariff effect, 
estimates the variation that would be caused by a change in tariffs with 
unchanged world prices and composition of imports - i.e. the effects of 
trade policy.16 
Quantity Eff. = [~«(};/T;t)/~ «(};t*Pit)] - [~(Qit_I*Tit)/~ (Qit-I*Pit)] 
Price Eff. 
= [~( Qit_I*Tit)/~ (Qit-I*Pit)] - [ = ~ (Qit-l*TiJ/~ (Qit-l*Pit- l ] 
TariffEff. 
= [~( Qit-I* Tit)/~ (Qit-I*Pit- I)] - [~( (};t-I*T;t-I)/~ «(};t-1*Pit- I)] 
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2 Departamento de Historia Economica e Instituciones, Universidad Carlos III 
de Madrid, Calle Madrid 126. 28903 Getafe (Spain). 
3 Most of the theoretically founded indices of protection developed recently are 
impracticable when using time series. Learner's and other indices of protection 
based on a Heckscher-Ohlin empirical model or the CGE (Computable 
General Equilibrium) models require knowledge of the basic production struc-
ture; unfortunately when the input-Qutput data is available, it is feasible only 
for some isolated years. Even the most simplified GCE model, as that used by 
Anderson's TRI (Trade Restrictiveness Index), which does not require the 
exact knowledge of the production structure, is based on import and tariff data 
disaggregated enough to make the index only empirically feasible for bench-
mark comparisons. For the theoretic of the TRI model, see Anderson and 
Neary (1996), and Anderson (1998) for a comparative study in 1989-90. 
4 Edwards (1993) uses import-export to GDP ratios to obtain a classification of 
the openness of countries for the second half of the twentieth century. The 
equilibrium ratio of this measure relies on the size and changes in the trade 
structure and demand-elasticities that make this measure endogenous and 
unconvincing over the long run. For a review of the empirical studies of the 
relation between trade policy and economic growth during the post-war years, 
see Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999). 
5 There are many reasons that justify the use of the tariff average as a protection 
Assessing protectionist intensity of tariffs 119 
index in the long run. Edwards (1998) runs a regression of total productivity 
growth on nine alternative indicators of openness, but only three results are 
statistically significant, the trade tax ratio being the only one not being a 
complex arbitrary variable constructed by an institution. 
6 'Although import substitution policies have gradually lost their shine over the 
postwar period, their reputation has remained intact for the late nineteenth 
century' (Irwin, 2002: 1). Most notably Bairoch (1976a, 1989, 1996) extols pro-
tectionism as instrumental in the development of late-nineteenth-century 
Continental Europe. 
7 This is only a general statement, as protective tariffs can also boost tariff 
revenue. Irwin (1998) measures the import elasticity in the USA at the end of 
the nineteenth century and shows how higher tariffs in protected products 
raised additional customs collections. Strictly speaking, it depends on the 
import demand elasticity and whether the previous level of the tariff was below 
the revenue-maximising tariff. 
8 For an extension of the index number problems in tariff averaging see Tumlir 
and Till (1971) and Federico and Tena (1998). 
9 O'Rourke (1997) puts forward this argument in the context of the discussion 
of the applicability of the Anderson TRI CGE model to resolve the Nye-Irwin 
debate. He concludes that when there is a high proportion of products with a 
low elasticity of demand of any given country, the specification of the import 
demand elasticity is crucial to the determination of the impact of the import 
tariff structure on aggregate welfare. 
10 Nineteenth-century United States protectionism constitutes a paradigmatic 
case of government revenue being heavily dependent on tariff revenue. Most 
US tariffs were levied on commodities, which were also domestically pro-
duced. Perhaps it was bound to be so given the spatial extension of the 
country and its climatic variety, which made them a producer of almost every 
'exotic' consumer good (the only exception being cane sugar, only produced 
in small quantities in Louisiana). Irwin (1998) documents the different 
behaviour of the general index depending on the inclusion or exclusion of 
sugar in the general index. Variations were less significant in Europe, as is 
shown below. 
11 See Irwin (1993: 147). 
12 Irwin (1993: 146). This argument reflects the mainstream view on the history 
of British taxation. For a very recent account, see Martin Daunton (2001). In a 
summary of its main conclusion, Daunton insiSts that: 
excise duties were 'voluntary', falling on goods such as tobacco or spirits 
which the tax payers could do without - they might even be morally 
suspect narcotics. Import duties were limited to commodities which could 
not be produced at home (such as sugar or tea), so that they did not offer 
any protection to domestic producers, with the danger of distorting the 
allocation of resources in the economy. 
(Daunton, 2001: 10) 
13 Surprisingly Nye does not tackle this point in his last article on this topic 
(Dankhilas and Nye 2004). 
14 This is the difference between the total tariff average including fiscal duties 
and that excluding them expressed as a percentage of the latter. It represents 
the weight of fiscal items in the (conventional) nominal tariff across time and 
between countries. If the total tariff average including fiscal duties is lower 
than that excluding them, then the result is negative. This means that the tariff 
average would be higher if we eliminate fiscal duties. 
15 See Tena (2001). 
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16 For an extension of index number problems in tariff averaging, see Tumlir and 
Till (1971) and Federico and Tena (1998) 
17 The problem has been dealt with recently by Crucini (1994). However, his 
approach is less accurate in so far as it takes into account the duty and price 
effects only. 
